

Breakout Session 2 Elements of Secure Biometric-Based Authentication Systems



Workshop on Biometrics and Remote E-Authentication Over Open Networks



Objective

➤ Determine: How should biometrics play a role at each of the 4 'identity authentication assurance levels'

Level	Confidence in Asserted Identity's Validity
1	Little or none
2	Some
3	High
4	Very High



Currently Specified

- Biometric methods are widely used to authenticate individuals who are physically present at the authentication point, for example for entry into buildings.
- Biometrics do not constitute secrets suitable for use in the conventional remote authentication protocols addressed in this document.
- In the local authentication case, where the claimant is observed and uses a capture device controlled by the verifier, authentication does not require that biometrics be kept secret.
- The use of biometrics to "unlock" conventional authentication tokens and to prevent repudiation of registration is identified in this document.





Questions to be answered

- What architectures are appropriate?
- What properties of the biometric components are required?
- What issues need to be addressed?
- How can cryptographic and other security mechanisms be used in conjunction with biometrics to provide a robust authentication solution?
- What architectures provide the features needed for use at each level?
- What criteria should be used to rate these architectures?





Questions (cont'd)

- ➤ How does the fact that biometrics are not secrets affect the way they are used?
- What role do certifications play?
- What differences exist between access by employees and the citizenry?
- Can/should FAR requirements be identified for each level?





Architectures

- Basic considerations
 - Where is the biometric enrollment data stored?
 - Where is the matching performed?
 - How is the data protected during storage & transmission?
 - What protections exist on the system as a whole
 & on the individual components?
 - What protections are assumed for a physical token and do these same protections apply to a biometric device?
 - What are the threats and risks, really? What can we assume about an attacker at each level?
 - Is local/token matching always better than server based matching? Why?





Biometrics as an authentication token

- 800-63 precludes this (even at Level 1)
 - Tokens are always secrets
 - Biometrics are not secrets
 - ergo, biometrics cannot be used as tokens
- Analogy between biometrics & the public key?

Signed/ Device **Enrolled** Live sample encrypted security template level Secure Secure Signed/ Storage channel encrypted Type=enroll SSL/TLS Header contains type/DTG/etc





Authentication Tokens

Table 2. Token Types Allowed at Each Assurance Level

Token type	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Hard crypto token	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{}$
One-time password device	√	√	1	
Soft crypto token	√	√	√	
Passwords & PINs	1	1		



Potential issues to be addressed

- Secrecy
- Randomness
- Revocation
- Spoofing and other attacks
- Non-repudiation
- Public review
- Privacy considerations
- What issues are unique to biometrics?
- How does the introduction of biometrics alter or place additional requirements on the underlying security infrastructure?





More Questions

- How can biometric data be compromised?
 - What would it take to do this?
- What could it be used for if obtained?
 - What existing security mechanisms are in place to protect against this?
 - What new mechanisms are needed?

800-63 does a good job of identifying potential attacks, but does not look at attacks against a biometric specifically.





Comparison of technologies

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Passwords One-time passwords Random passwords		
Soft crypto token Symmetric Asymmetric		
Hard token		
Physical token		
Biometric		

Time permitting & if deemed worthwhile

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Problem to be solved

- Remember:
 - "security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information"
- Example scenarios from OMB M-04-04:
 - Level 1:
 - an individual applies to a Federal agency for an annual park visitor's permit
 - Level 2:
 - A beneficiary changes her address of record through the Social Security web site.
 - Level 3:
 - A patent attorney electronically submits confidential patent information to the US Patent and Trademark Office.
 - Level 4:
 - A law enforcement official accesses a law enforcement database containing criminal records.





Discussions

- Impossible to avoid discussion of threats and countermeasures, but will attempt to not delve too deeply into this
 - Subject of separate breakout session
- However, it is difficult to discuss a security architecture in isolation from the threats against it.



Approach

- Begin with review of how biometrics are characterized and utilized within the current 800-63 document
 - Perhaps challenging some underlying assumptions & paradigms
- Brainstorm & suggest ways that biometrics can be used effectively
- Identify limitations, constraints, and requirements to how they should be used
- Determine what requirements on the system as a whole are needed to allow biometrics to be integrated appropriately





End Goal

- Prepare a recommendation on use of biometrics at each of the 4 levels, providing:
 - A general description of the mechanism
 - Identification of requirements for use
 - An example use case scenario
 - Identification of components
- Recommend contents for a Biometric Appendix (?)





Ancillary Goals

- Identify areas for additional research
- Provide recommendations for:
 - Standards existing/new
 - Testing & certification
- Provide recommendations for improvements to industry:
 - Biometric component vendors
 - System integrators / solution providers





Keep in Mind

- Perfection is neither achievable nor required
- Our job is to figure out how good is has to be

How to make it so.

and







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